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AbsTRACT 
Is the wish to be biologically related to your children 
legitimate? Here, I respond to an argument in support of 
a negative answer to this question according to which 
a preference towards having children one is biologically 
related to is analogous to a preference towards 
associating with members of one’s own race. I reject 
this analogy, mainly on the grounds that only the latter 
constitutes discrimination; still, I conclude that indeed a 
preference towards children one is biologically related to 
is morally illegitimate because, in the context of parental 
love, biological considerations are normatively irrelevant.
Debates about the value of being biologically 
related to one’s family tend to run along a predict-
able divide: conservatives argue that biological ties 
are valuable and go on to criticise reproductive 
technologies such as in vitro fertilisation (IVF) that 
enable non-biological families.1 2
Liberals defend reproductive technologies on 
grounds of allowing access to parenthood to a 
diverse group of people including single parents, 
couples with fertility problems, lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgenders and others.3
Two complications ought to be added to this 
simple dichotomy: on the one hand, from a feminist 
point of view, IVF and other reproductive technol-
ogies could be seen as instruments of patriarchy as 
those methods reinforce a bias in favour of biolog-
ical ties, which has arguably been used to oppress 
women.4 5 This kind of feminist objection may not 
be enough to make reproductive technologies ethi-
cally impermissible but it would certainly see them 
as, at least, politically problematic.
There is, however, a second complication which 
may be enough to go full circle all the way back to the 
conservative moral prohibition against reproductive 
technologies: the idea that a wish to be biologically 
related to one’s children is itself illegitimate.
An argument of this kind has been recently 
put forward by Rebecca Roache6 against Ezio Di 
Nucci’s feminist critique of reproductive technolo-
gies.5 According to Roache, the wish to be biologi-
cally tied to one’s children could be seen as a form 
of discrimination:
But is this wish really legitimate, in the sense that ‘the 
state ought not to interfere with it’? Is it any more 
legitimate than, say, a wish to associate only with 
people to whom one is racially connected (however 
we might interpret ‘racially connected’)? Culturally, 
we tend to view the wish to be biologically related 
to one's children as more benign than the wish to 
be racially related to one's associates. But cultures 
can be wrong about things like this, as we can see 
by considering that in the past, and in some cultures 
presently, the wish to associate only with members 
of one's race is also viewed as benign. Further, the 
wish to be biologically related to one's children—like 
the wish to associate only within one's racial group—
can have harmful effects. The wish to associate only 
with members of one's own race can (and does) result 
in people being denied important opportunities on 
account of their race. And the wish to be biologically 
related to one's children means that the vast majority 
of aspiring parents create new babies, despite there 
being millions of existing children without families in 
need of adoption or foster care; as a result, aspiring 
parents' preference for biological relatedness to their 
children leads to existing parentless children being 
denied the opportunity of a family.6
Before assessing this argument against parents’ 
wish to be biologically related to their children, let 
us place it within the wider dialectic of the ethical 
debate about reproductive technologies. If the wish to 
be biologically related to one’s children is illegitimate, 
then an important motivation for using reproductive 
technologies would have been shown to be ethically 
problematic, but that in itself does not show that 
reproductive technologies are morally problematic.
There are a number of reasons for that: first, from 
a theoretical point of view, because we cannot assume 
that the value of motivation determines the value of 
action—because the truth of some form of conse-
quentialism or some other alternative to a Kantian 
approach would have to be ruled out first. Second, 
the reason why one may want to use reproductive 
technologies need not have anything to do with 
wanting to be biologically related to one’s children: 
if you cannot qualify for adoption, for example, you 
may have no alternative to reproductive technologies 
even if you are truly indifferent to biological ties.
Third—and more to the point—an argument could 
be offered for reproductive technologies even if we 
assume the truth of some form of Kantianism and we 
take a case in which someone’s motivation has to do 
with biological ties, which would set aside both of the 
previous worries. That argument could go something 
like this: even if the wish to be biologically related to 
one’s children is illegitimate, it is a widespread one 
that a lot of people can and do satisfy pretty easily 
without the assistance of reproductive technologies.
So that banning reproductive technologies 
on the ground that the wish to be biologically 
related to one’s children is illegitimate—if that is 
done without at the same time intervening to stop 
everyone else from satisfying that wish—would 
discriminate against those who need the assistance 
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of reproductive technologies for the satisfaction of their illegit-
imate wish.
Here, it could be objected that denying equal access to an ille-
gitimate practice would not be discriminatoryi: so that it is only 
real discrimination if the practice is not illegitimate. I am not 
sure about this: imagine that a certain group of people were to 
be suddenly denied access to cars able to do >200 km/h. Say, 
everybody born on a Friday can from this day on only drive cars 
with <100 hp. I am pretty confident that such legislation would 
lead to the downfall of any government.
A plausible argument from the point of view of equal oppor-
tunities along the lines of the one sketched above serves to show 
the way in which the question about the legitimacy of repro-
ductive technologies has to be kept separate from the question 
about the legitimacy of the wish to be biologically related to 
one’s children. But that obviously is still no answer to the ques-
tion of whether the wish to be biologically tied to one’s children 
is legitimate. It is to that question that we now turn.
Roache’s analogy is, admittedly, a powerful one. Spelling it 
out, one could think—on the one hand—in terms of a prefer-
ence towards associating with members of one’s race over asso-
ciating with members of other races and—on the other hand—in 
terms of a preference towards having children who are geneti-
cally similar to oneself over having children who are not (or less) 
genetically similar to oneself.
Let me first point out that the way I have just spelled out 
Roache’s analogy is importantly different from the original, as 
it removes a potentially disanalogous element from Roache’s 
original analogy, the stipulation that association is ‘only’ with 
members of one’s race.
The wish to be biologically related to one’s children need not 
be cashed out in terms of a wish to have only children with whom 
one is biologically related—one may have such wish despite (or 
even because? and anyway at the same time as) having children 
with whom one is not biologically related.ii
It is particularly important to reformulate the analogy by 
getting rid of the ‘only’ clause because, as above, the original 
analogy is in fact not analogous; and because it may make a 
difference to the plausibility of the racial discrimination charge 
to which preferring children who are biologically related to 
oneself is supposed to be analogous.
After all, one may think that there is a moral difference 
between associating only with members of one’s own race and 
preferring association with members of one’s own race to associ-
ation with members of other races (whatever, if anything, ‘race’ 
means); and that, namely, the former is morally worse than the 
latter. Still, at a minimum, I think we will all agree that both are 
morally objectionable.
Having removed this small distraction, let us look at the 
following analogy:
A. A preference towards associating with members of one’s race 
over associating with members of other races;
B. A preference towards having children with whom one is bio-
logically related over having children with whom one is not 
biologically related.
The argument is supposed to run as follows:
I. A is morally objectionable.
II. B is analogous to A.
III. B is morally objectionable.
i  Many thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
ii  Similarly, one may wish both children with whom one is biologically 
related and children with whom one is not, that is also consistent.
As (I) is true, here I am going to focus on (II). The power of 
the analogy between A and B consists, first of all, in the struc-
tural similarity between the two cases: in both A and B, we have 
biological features as the grounds for a preference.iii Further-
more, similarity (or at least perceived similarity) appears to play 
a role in both A and B, so that in both cases there seems to be a 
preference for those who are (more) similar to us.
Once we have analysed the analogy between A and B in 
terms of a structural similarity consisting of a preference based 
on biological features, we can also see what the problem with 
comparing a preference for biological children with racism is: 
preferences based on biological features are very widespread and 
it is far from clear that they are all discriminatory based on the 
above structural similarity.iv
We have preferences that are—in the relevant sense—based 
on biological features within most of our interactions: social, 
romantic, professional, even in terms of preferring some pets or 
other animals to others or indeed within our interaction with the 
natural environment, as when we prefer some kind of flower over 
others. A broad interpretation of ‘preferences based on biolog-
ical features’, namely the one which is the basis for analogy (II), 
would have to count all of these interactions as discriminatory 
in some sense—even though some may not be morally relevant, 
as with flowers (while already animals would clearly be a more 
difficult case as they cannot be dismissed normatively).
Indeed, it is not even clear that it would be cognitively possible 
to avoid having these preferences at all, thereby violating ‘ought 
implies can’. We need to be much more specific, then, about 
this talk of ‘preferences based on biological features’. If we are 
not more specific than this broad idea that preferences based on 
biological features are discriminatory, we run the risk of ending 
up weakening arguments against racism by basing them on too 
broad foundations. What is crucial, clearly, is the normative 
irrelevance of biological features in a particular context. When 
it comes to which people you prefer associating with, race is 
normatively irrelevant.
Also, whatever one thinks of basing preferences on biology, 
there seems to be something particularly horrific in basing them 
on race, for a series of reasons: because race is such a superficial 
concept both in terms of its biological underpinnings and in terms 
of how much it says about an individual; because race is a seriously 
underdetermined (many would say: socially constructed) concept 
and most importantly because of the history of preferences based 
on race.
The question that we should ask is the following: when it 
comes to our children, is whether they are biologically tied to us 
similarly normatively irrelevant so that biological features would 
not be a legitimate basis for preference?
The answer to this question is, I think, yes. Let me reformulate 
the relevant claim explicitly: biological features are not a morally 
legitimate basis for preferring some children to others, which 
means that the wish that our children be biologically tied to us 
iii  Here things can get quite complicated pretty quickly, as ‘biological’ 
is a very broad adjective in debates about reproductive technologies, 
including both genetic and gestational.5 9  This is particularly relevant 
in the context of a comparison with race, as one could deny that prefer-
ences based on race are based on biological properties. I am not going to 
pursue this possible disanalogy between A and B here because it would 
take us too far.
iv  This is stating the obvious given the context of the argument, but just 
in case: when I talk of ‘preferences based on biological features’ I am 
obviously not talking about the biological underpinnings of the prefer-
ence in the subject who has the preference but about (perceived) biolog-
ical features within the object of the preference.
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is, in the relevant sense, not morally legitimate because it distin-
guishes on the basis of features that are normatively irrelevant.
Here, I will not repeat my argument for this claim because it 
is the one that I have already offered in the broader context of 
reproductive technologies: basically, that such biological consid-
erations are patriarchal and that they have no place within 
parental love.5 7 8 I would rather like to explain the scope of 
my claim and the reasons why I do not think that it should be 
equated with racial discrimination.
Two points: first, for the reasons I have already given (see 
also footnote 4), race is a special case that I do not think should 
be reduced to other kinds of biological features, as (1) it is not 
even clear that race has any proper biological foundation and (2) 
racial discrimination has a history and social significance that we 
ought to be always mindful of.
The second point is, I believe, even more basic and therefore 
more important: a preference for children that one is biologi-
cally tied to may be morally illegitimate but that does not mean 
that it is also discriminatory. This is for the simple reason that 
while a preference towards associating with members of one’s 
own race actually discriminates non-members, a preference for 
having children that one is biologically tied to does not discrim-
inate against anybody—or so I argue below.
Here, there would be two main candidates for discrimination: 
potential adoptees and (unborn) non-biological children; in the 
former case, one may argue that a preference towards biological 
children may result in non-adopting and thereby discriminate 
against the non-adopted child while in the latter case one could 
similarly argue that a preference for biological children may result 
in not initiating a non-biological parental project, which would lead 
to the existence of a child that one is not biologically related to.
The latter case is quickly dealt with: one cannot discriminate 
against non-existent (non)beings such as unborn children who 
have not even been conceived yet, so the latter is not a case of 
discrimination. The former case, on the other hand, is one that 
does involve beings against which discrimination is possible—
living potential adoptees.
And those are children whose welfare is morally urgent. Still, 
the reason why I do not think we can speak of discrimination 
in the case of the decision not to adopt is simply that there are 
other plausible reasons why potential parents may decide not 
to adopt, for example, the gestational bond; or wanting to be 
involved with a child from day 1.
As it is difficult to image a case of a decision not to adopt where 
biological ties would be relevant but those other considerations 
would not be relevant, I think that the more helpful thought-ex-
periment concerns a scenario in which a preference for biological 
ties would weigh more than some—although minor—genetic risk 
that could be avoided through egg or sperm donation. It seems to 
me that in such a case, given the normative irrelevance of biolog-
ical ties, a parent should opt for egg or sperm donation rather than 
insist on being biologically tied to one’s children.v
Still, what about those children for whom being adopted 
may be the only reasonable chance of survival or at least of 
v  There is a further case which I think we will all agree would on the 
other hand constitute discrimination; namely, the case of a parent of 
both biological and non-biological children who would treat her biolog-
ical children better than her non-biological children. Interestingly, the 
historical case of widespread discrimination against illegitimate children 
is not based on biological ties, as both legitimate and illegitimate children 
would have been biologically tied to the parent in question but on social 
considerations such as marriage or inheritance.
a decent life—and who will not be adopted as a result of 
someone opting for reproductive technologies? What I have 
said above should not be interpreted as disregard for their 
welfare: after all, I am saying that a preference for biolog-
ical children is illegitimate. Here, I would add that, in an 
hypothetical case in which the reason not to adopt had only 
to do with biological ties and not with plausible preferences 
such as wanting to be involved with a child from day 1, 
for example, it probably would be discrimination against the 
non-adopted.
Let us take stock: we have analysed an argument for the 
illegitimacy of a preference towards having children who 
are biologically related to oneself; the argument is based on 
an analogy between the above preference and a preference 
towards associating with people who are racially related to 
oneself; we have shown the structural similarities between 
the two cases in terms of the shared element of a prefer-
ence based on biological features. But we have also shown 
that we must be much more specific about this idea of pref-
erences based on biological features to avoid having an 
analogy that is too broad to be plausible. And an increased 
level of specificity points to two potentially disanalogous 
aspects: the particularity of racial preferences and the issue 
of discrimination.
I would now like to conclude by briefly remarking on the 
practical consequences of the above argument: we have argued 
that a preference towards children with whom one is biolog-
ically related is not morally legitimate but that, at the same 
time, it does not constitute a case of discrimination and that it 
is not analogous to racism. But where does the moral illegit-
imacy of a preference towards biological children leave us in 
terms of policy?
Here, it is helpful to think of preferences for having biolog-
ical children as moral vices not serious enough to be legislated 
on directly but that, on the other hand, put pressure on our 
failure, as a society, to make sure that having non-biological 
children is just as accessible—if not just as easy—as having 
biological children.
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